
Rethinking Network Policy Coordination — A Database Perspective


Anduo Wang^{*} Seungwon Shin[†] Eduard Dragut^{*} *Temple University †KAIST

APNet 2019 August 18, 2019, Beijing


database usage in networking great for managing network state




database usage in networking great for managing network state — factual data




data synchronization




data query




data query




database usage in networking data query




database usage in networking focus on managing factual data



database usage in networking but database is also renowned for mediating semantic data



database usage in networking but database is also renowned for *mediating semantic data* — *policies* about what are the acceptable data




this talk

if and how can database systems help with managing network policies that can interact in complex ways


this talk

if and how can database systems help with managing network policies that can interact in complex ways


disparate representations buried in the network




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
disparate representations buried in the network – hinders rather than facilitates interaction




disparate representations buried in the network




disparate representations buried in the network – hinders rather than facilitates interaction




complementary policies in SDNsjointly satisfiable



complementary policies in SDNsjointly satisfiable but not independent




conflicting policies in inter-domain routingoverlooked conflicts within an autonomous system (AS)



conflicting policies in inter-domain routing

- overlooked conflicts within an autonomous system (AS)
 - AS3 and AS4 attempt to influence route selection of the middle AS



disparate representations buried in the network

complementary policies in SDNs

- jointly satisfiable but not independent
- conflicting policies in inter-domain routing
 - overlooked conflicts within an AS

a database solution

disparate representations a unified knowledge buried in the network representation

policy as integrity constraints (ICs)

- complementary policies in SDNs
 - jointly satisfiable but not independent
- conflicting policies in inter-domain routing
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a database solution

disparate representations a unified knowledge buried in the network representation

- complementary policies in SDNs
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update orchestrator
 dependency analysis of policy ICs

- policy as integrity

constraints (ICs)

policy interaction — a database solution

disparate representations a unified knowledge buried in the network representation

- complementary policies in SDNs
 - jointly satisfiable but not independent
- conflicting policies in inter-domain routing
 - overlooked conflicts within an AS

update orchestrator
 dependency analysis of policy ICs

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constraints (ICs)



a unifying representation

network state — factual data — as relations - example schema

% intradomain tables tp(sid,nid) rm(fid,sid,nid) (matrix) cf(fid,sid,nid) table) path(pv,cost,iid,eid) % internal path

- % topology
- % end-to-end reachability
- % configuration (forwarding

% interdomain tables aspath(did,rid,apv) % AS level path

a unifying representation


policies — semantic data — as integrity constraints (ICs)

- -denial form: :- b_1 , b_2 , ..., b_n ($\bot \leftarrow b_1 \land b_2 \land ... \land b_n$.)
- meaning: b1,b2, ...,bn cannot be simultaneously true.
- example

```
% routing policy
IC<sub>1</sub> :- ¬rm(F,S,D),cf(F,X,Y).
IC<sub>2</sub> :- rm(F,S,D), ¬cf(F,X,Y).
```

% security policy IC₃ :- rm(F,S,D),blacklist(S,D).

relating network state & policy




update orchestrator

manage complementary policies in SDNs

 multiple disjoint policies oversee a single task


arrange network updates into a semantic layering



semantic dependency

policy x depends on y if

x update can violate y policy and trigger y action but y can not affect x




determine semantic dependency

dependency analysis by satisfiability reasoning

check whether Δ_x can alter the result of v_y

check whether Δ_y cannot alter v_x ,




determine semantic dependency

dependency analysis by satisfiability reasoning

 $(\Delta_x \text{ condition}) \land (v_y \text{ condition}) \text{ is } SAT$

 $(\Delta_y \text{ condition}) \land (v_x \text{ condition}) \text{ is } UNSAT$




policy negotiator

manage conflicting policies within an AS

- under the influences of multiple neighbors unaware of each other
- derive and merge policy impacts


derive and merge policy impacts

an AS under the influences of p_1 and p_2




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
derive and merge policy impacts

an AS under the influences of p_1 and p_2




residue method

residue — syntactic fragment that anticipates impact, computed by partial subsumption




residue method

residue — syntactic fragment that anticipates impact, computed by partial subsumption



residue method

residue — syntactic fragment that anticipates impact, computed by partial subsumption



moving forward

- expressiveness of the IC representation
 - -facilitating template, translating tool
- cyclic dependency in SDN
 - -break cycles
- policies are private in interdomain
 - obfuscate policies

recap

disparate representations a unified knowledge buried in the network representation

- complementary policies in SDNs
 - jointly satisfiable but not independent
- conflicting policies in inter-domain routing
 - overlooked conflicts within an AS

update orchestrator
 dependency analysis of policy ICs

- policy as integrity

constraints (ICs)








part of "Ravel database-defined networking" <u>ravel-net.org</u>

backup

residue computation by example

%% shortest path
IC_{sp} :- r_o(x,y,z), r_i(x,y₂,z₂), l(z)>l(z₂).
%% explicit path policy
IC_{ep}: z=a :- r_o(x,y,z), x=d.



 IC_{sp} affects IC_{ep} , as anticipated by the residue