## Fauré: a Partial Approach to Network Analysis

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HotNets 2021, Nov 11

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### network analysis



### network analysis



### complete network analysis













## a partial approach



## a partial approach



## loss-less modeling





#### modeling primary 5 2 backup $\rightarrow$ $\rightarrow$ $\rightarrow$ . . . F node node F node node F node node forwarding 3 2 3 tables 3 4 2 3 2 3 3 4 2 3 4 • • • 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 (reachability) query src dest R src dest R src dest R 2 3 3 5 3 4 • • •

4

4

I 5 2 3

2

5

3

4

2

2

• • •

2

• • •

4







3

. . .

### loss-less modeling

![](_page_22_Figure_1.jpeg)

difference (between regular- and c- tables) not visible to the query

### loss-less modeling

![](_page_23_Figure_1.jpeg)

difference (between regular- and c- tables) not visible to the query

## loss-less modeling with SQL?

![](_page_24_Figure_1.jpeg)

difference (between regular- and c- tables) not visible to the SQL

## loss-less modeling with SQL?

#### all definite instances (regular tables) partial representation (c-tables) Rep . . . SQL extended SQL Rep . . .

#### $\checkmark$ ad hoc data retrieval

#### × static analysis

### loss-less modeling with fauré-log

![](_page_26_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_26_Picture_2.jpeg)

#### $\checkmark$ static analysis

## from datalog to fauré-log

	datalog	fauré-log
syntax (rules q)	$H(u) := B_1(u_1), \cdots, B_n(u_n).$	$\begin{array}{l} H(u)[(\wedge^{n_{i=1}}\varphi_{i})\wedge(\wedge^{m_{i=1}}C_{i})]:\\ B_{1}(u_{1})[\varphi_{1}],\cdots,B_{n}(u_{n})[\varphi_{n}],\\ C_{1},\cdots,C_{m}. \end{array}$
semantics	$q(\mathbf{I}) = \{\upsilon(u) \mid \upsilon(u_i) \in \mathbf{I}\}, \mathbf{I}$ is	s a database over schema R

#### notions and definitions

ui (free tuples)	contains symbols in var(q) and dom(	dom(R)				
dom(R) (attribute domain over schema R)	constants	constants U {x̄,ȳ,z̄,}				
υ (valuation)	U: var(q)→dom(R) (i.e.,{x,y,z	$z,\} \rightarrow constants U \{\bar{x}, \bar{y}, \bar{z},\}$				
var(q) (variables)	{x,y,z,}					

![](_page_28_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_29_Figure_1.jpeg)

failure patterns over R	R	src o	dest	
$T_1(f,n_1,n_2)[\phi \wedge \bar{x}+\bar{y}+\bar{z}=1] :- R(f,n_1,n_2)[\phi], \bar{x}+\bar{y}+\bar{z}=1.$ % reachability under 2-link failure		Ι	2	<b>x</b> =I 
$T_2(f,2,5)[\phi \wedge \bar{y}=0] :- T_1(f,2,5)[\phi], \bar{y}=0.$		Ι	5	<b>ϫ</b> =Ι∧ӯ=Ι∧ <del></del> Ξ=Ι
reachability between 2 and 5 under 2-link		I	5	x=0∧z=I
failure, one of the failure must be (2,3)		Ι	5	x=0∧z=0
T <sub>3</sub> (f,1,n2)[Ø ∧ ÿ+z̄<2] :- R(f,1,n <sub>2</sub> )[Ø], ÿ+z̄<2. %		I	5	<b>x</b> =I∧ӯ=0
reachability to 1 with at least 1-link failure		2	3	<b>ÿ</b> =∣

![](_page_30_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_31_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_32_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_33_Figure_1.jpeg)

#### example relative-complete verification

![](_page_34_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_34_Figure_2.jpeg)

#### example relative-complete verification

![](_page_35_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_35_Figure_2.jpeg)

#### example relative-complete verification

![](_page_36_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_36_Figure_2.jpeg)

![](_page_37_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_38_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_39_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_40_Figure_1.jpeg)

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![](_page_47_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_48_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_49_Figure_1.jpeg)

# preliminary result

practical implementation in SQL

- shallow embedding of fauré-log in PostgreSQL + Z3

evaluation

- realistic topology (inferred from BGP announcements)
- synthetic link failures
- representative queries
  - q4-q5 (all pair-wise reachability), q6-q8 (various failure patterns)

	$q_4 - q_5$	q <sub>6</sub>			q <sub>7</sub>			q <sub>8</sub>		
#prefix	sql	sql	Z3	#tuples	sql	Z3	#tuples	sql	Z3	#tuples
1000	0.625s	0.85s(0.11%)	796.35s	42425	0.08s(22.86%)	0.27s	16	0.15s(1.17%)	12.64s	828
10000	5.75s	8.96s	-	418224	0.27s(7.33%)	3.41s	194	1.8s(1.27%)	137.05s	8706
100000	54.85s	113.48s	-	4435862	1.66s(6.18%)	25.22s	1387	34.67s(1.71%)	1941.04s	86360
922067	816.4s	4169.02s	-	46503247	11.1s(3.71%)	288.17s	16490	267.05s	-	858180

### recap — partial analysis

![](_page_51_Figure_1.jpeg)

### recap — realization

![](_page_52_Figure_1.jpeg)

### recap — realization

![](_page_53_Figure_1.jpeg)

### recap — realization

![](_page_54_Figure_1.jpeg)

## thank you

https://github.com/ravel-net/Faure